THE EMBASSY
AND CONSULATES
(Source:
Chapter 8. – “Bilateral Diplomacy” by Kishan Rana)
In earlier times, some countries
maintained two separate diplomatic services, one consisting of those who spent
all their time abroad, working in the embassies, and another composed of those
whose entire career was at headquarters. The Dutch were the last to operate
such a system, up to some 30 years back, but today all foreign services see
virtue in a unified system that rotates officials between home and abroad. The
bulk of diplomatic missions are of a bilateral character, the exceptions being
the missions accredited to multilateral agencies, like the UN Headquarters in
New York, or WTO in Geneva, or the Disarmament Commission, or the UN
specialized agencies that are located there. The same is true of Vienna, which
is the seat of agencies like IAEA, and UNIDO. Then there is Brussels, both the
capital of Belgium and the seat of the European Commission and NATO (most
non-Western countries have a common mission there that handles all the work
under multiple hats, while Western states have separate missions for each).
What are the personnel needs in typical bilateral missions, in terms of duties
at different levels, and the personal skills this entails?
The bilateral mission is the operational
end of the diplomatic apparatus, with no direct policy-making role, but a
significant policy advisory responsibility. It is the place where the roles of Promotion, Outreach, Feedback, and Servicing
are played to the full, in relation to the single country of assignment
(ignoring the situations where the mission may also handle a concurrent
responsibility for representation in another country as well). I have argued
elsewhere that because of the work overload at headquarters, and the
multiplicity of contacts between nations, official and non-official, the
bilateral mission has also gained a new role of “Management” of the
bilateral relationship. This is simply because there is no other unit of government
that has a near-total view of the relationship with a particular country that
the mission commands. With comes a capacity to identify cross-connections
between disparate issues, which are available to the alert practitioner for
leverage and relationship management.
Some diplomacy theorists have argued that
the embassy has become a simple agency implementing the instructions of the
foreign ministry, often left out of the information loop by the home
authorities. They do not see it as a contributor to policy. True, heads of
state carry out direct diplomacy often without even the knowledge of the MFA
(Chapter 10). Such exchanges are a fact of life for the entire diplomatic
system. But generally the alert mission abroad has local sources to track such
direct contacts, such as the offices of the heads of state and government. The
MFA and other home agencies can ill-afford to neglect the mission’s local
contacts and ground knowledge. Further, the same instant communications that
place the embassy constantly at the reach of the headquarters in real time,
give it the possibility of being consulted at different stages of policy
formulation. Intranet-based confidential email exchange systems enable the
alert ambassador to keep in close touch with colleagues at the foreign
ministry, to intervene judiciously, and in effect “write his own instructions”.[1]
Thus we see that increasing complexity in
international relationships has actually given the bilateral mission an
enhanced role and new capabilities. Far from confronting demise, the ambassador
and his embassy colleagues emerged as a more active player in bilateral
diplomacy. Of course, they are not an independent agents, and the task of
relationship management is exercised jointly, and under the supervision, of the
embassy’s principal partner at home, the territorial division at headquarters.
Most countries send out new foreign service
entrants on their first assignments abroad as third secretaries or attachés,
usually “on probation”.[2]
Their confirmation or permanent appointment depends on passing various internal
examinations on regulations and financial procedures, as well as usually a
“compulsory” foreign language that is assigned to them. This language becomes
the basis of their initial regional specialization. But there are small
diplomatic services that do not require foreign languages study as a
precondition to confirmation. Generally, the rank of third secretary is a
transitory stage for the official under training and promotion as second
secretary comes on confirmation in the service. The trainees are placed under
the special charge and oversight of the ambassador, and are rotated against
different jobs in the mission, so as to broaden their experience.
Like the desk officer at headquarters, the
first or second secretary in a mission is the workhorse of the diplomatic
system. Promotion to the rank of first secretary may come after around 5 or 7
years of service, and the next step, as counselor comes after about 12 to 14
years of service.[3] Thus the
rank of second or first secretary is usually held through more than one
overseas appointment, and marks a significant stage in a career.
Reading
through the memoirs of diplomats belonging to one’s own service as well as
others, which cover their early diplomatic career, provides useful information
on the service’s work parameters, even if the setting of these recollections
seems dated to each generation of diplomats and out of touch with one’s own
contemporary times. All too often, change is more apparent than real, and such
books furnish valuable insight.
In
a large mission there may be several first and second secretaries, while the
small embassy may have only one, who also serves as deputy to the head of
mission, become the chargé d’ affaires ad
interim whenever the ambassador is away from the country. Consequently, the
duties of the first or second secretary can be clear-cut in a large mission, or
within the small mission he or she will become the jack-of-all-trades.
Ideally,
every junior official should be given some exposure to economic work and to
information duties, regardless of designation, because together with political
functions, these three areas lie at the center of diplomacy. Handling some jobs
in all the three sectors, even in a supplementary capacity, enriches and rounds
out the young official’s skill development. It prepares them for senior
assignments where each of these skills is viewed in holistic fashion, and woven
into the actual task in hand. It also enables the official to understand the
interconnections between the core diplomatic tasks. This is the essence of
“integrated” diplomacy.
Diplomatic service manuals, when these
exist, usually outline the duties of first secretaries in a rather simple
fashion. In one such compilation a brief reference to the first secretary
simply declares that he should perform the assigned political, commercial,
administrative, protocol or information work; supervise the local staff, draft
reports, and deliver talks to appropriate audiences. Perhaps one reason for the
sparseness of the advice is that the actual work is too varied to be listed. Formal
guidelines cannot tell the complete story, but an illustrative, practical
listing might cover the following:
a) Promotion and Outreach.
In the same principal tasks of the mission, reaching out and building
productive contacts, also fully engage the first secretary. The actual range of
individuals and institutions that he cultivates depend on the work handled, but
in diplomacy this is never restricted or confined to an exclusive sector.
Whatever the work assignment, the diplomat also pursues targets of opportunity
to add to the embassy’s wide contact base. The goal is to harness the relations
established to gather information, to persuade, and to create new opportunities
for advancing interests. One instance of junior diplomats playing a crucial
role was during the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966–69, when these
language specialists, networking among themselves, became the principal
information sources on the hand-written “wall newspapers” (through which
different groups of activists propelled the events of the time). An everyday
example is the relaxed, informal relations that these officials are usually
able to establish with counterpart officials of the host country, often getting
wind of new developments, or details of local thinking, that higher officials
are unable to access.
b) Reportage.
The junior official drafts, and in some cases finalizes on his own
responsibility, a sizable portion of the mission’s correspondence, periodic
reports, and special dispatches. The first secretary is generally not involved
in the drafting or writing of the cipher messages, mainly handled by the HOM
and the deputy chief of mission, but usually gets to see the outgoing and the
incoming messages, and needs to absorb from these some of the skills and
techniques that are involved.[4]
Indeed, reading through the “float copies” of dispatches and correspondence is
a vital learning, and an internal communication method within the embassy, as
also within the division or department at headquarters. It is good practice to
send out special dispatches written by junior officials over their own
signature, with a covering communication from the ambassador or DCM as
suitable. This motivates the official to give his or her best, and deepens
personal commitment.
c) Management.
The job of head of “chancery” or administration is usually held by one of the
first secretaries. In all but the very largest of embassies (where the total
number of staff, home-based and local may exceed 50 or more) it is not
appropriate to have this handled as a full-time assignment, if only because the
embassy then runs the risk of being “over-administered”.[5]
The embassy and the ambassador should keep administrative tasks in perspective.
It is important to follow the stipulated regulations, but a mission that is
engaged primarily in administration is in effect chasing its own tail. It is
far better to have a first secretary handle the chancery job as a sideline.
Example: in Germany, our 70-strong embassy had a first secretary (political)
supervised the chancery (and the work of the administration attaché) on a
concurrent basis, with no loss of efficiency. But practices vary and in British
missions, “head of chancery” is an honored designation, with some broader
internal coordination responsibility as well.
d) Servicing.
The official handling consular affairs handles this set of tasks, as also by
the commercial secretary, both of who interface with “customers” approaching
the embassy for services. The information secretary, involved in wide public
contacts, also performs this function. Such tasks place the diplomat in wide
public interaction and call for “people skills”, plus sensitivity to human problems.
More and more countries use a “citizen charter” formula to improve service
delivery and to overcome mindsets of bureaucracy.
The
ranks of counselor and the minister–counselor are customarily regarded as senior,
with the latter designated simply as “minister” in some systems Most countries
have also now adopted the US practice of designating, at least in large
mission, the embassy’s second-ranking official as “deputy chief of mission”
(DCM). Typically these senior officials in the bilateral mission handle tasks
that parallel those of the first secretary, but with greater autonomy, often
supervising the junior officials as well. As experienced diplomats they
function as valuable team members, independently handling projects and special
tasks — like media outreach, links with ethnic communities, cultural
projection, or economic promotion. In large mission they act as the
departmental heads, carrying out independent correspondence, locally and with
home agencies, but always under the overall supervision of the ambassador.
The
DCM in a large mission handles the day-to-day management, and may also
supervise some departments on behalf of the ambassador. In many diplomatic
systems he would have served earlier as an ambassador, heading a small mission,
and should have demonstrated leadership skills. The DCM’s relationship with his
own ambassador is of a special character, and demands accommodation and
flexibility by both, where autonomy of function for the DCM is traded for basic
discipline and loyalty to the ambassador. In practice, this often does not work
as well as intended, and situations of friction, even conflict within the
mission, are often traceable to problems within this particular equation.[6]
In extreme cases, the breakdown in their working relationship may lead to an
early transfer for the DCM, but long before this happens, the embassy will have
suffered in efficient performance. This is one instance where ease of
communication, especially through telephone calls to the foreign ministry
colleagues, accentuates such problems of indiscipline.
The
larger the mission, the greater the presence of officials from other agencies,
ranging from specialists from line ministries that have a sizable stake in the
country (covering agriculture, education, immigration, science & technology
or the like), to defense attachés and “undeclared” intelligence officials with
“cover” assignments. Welding them all into a united team is a major
responsibility for the ambassador and the DCM. Since the days of President
Eisenhower 1950s, every US president has made it a practice to address a
directive to all official agencies, designating the ambassador as the head of
the “country team” in the foreign state. He has the real power to send back any
official whose presence is judged by the ambassador as inimical to US
interests, as. This contributes to discipline, a perennial problem with
internal heterogeneity. But despite these powers, the US blue-ribbon
independent task force headed by Frank C Carlucci (former Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser) reported to the US Secretary of State in January
2001: “Ambassadors lack authority to coordinate and oversee the resources and
personnel deployed to their missions by other agencies and departments”.[7]
In other countries where even theoretical power to send back offending team
members do not exist, the management problems are more acute.
Sometimes
the presence of a significant contingent of non-diplomatic service personnel
leads to an “us-and-them” situation. What works in welding together a team is
the quality of leadership provided by the ambassador, not set formulas of
formal control. For instance, in the Indian system the best teamwork has been
performed where the HOM demonstrates through personal example that each
official is valued for the contribution made, regardless of the agency to which
the official belongs.
HR Management
Management
of human resources in the diplomatic service is related to public services in
general in the country, even if working conditions are exceptional. Some of
the issues that arise are: q
Does every competent member of the service have
fair chance to become an ambassador? This is the case with most well-run
services, especially if the definition of the top job is stretched to include
also the consuls general. For example this is true of France, Japan and
Germany that have large services, but not possible in the US, where the many
do not go beyond the position of DCM. Inevitably this poses morale problems. q
Is the system of postings transparent and fair? It
is impossible to expect officials to serve with efficiency and enthusiasm in
places as different as Madrid and Mogadishu, unless an equitable system of
rotation is practiced, responding to genuine needs of officials and their
family commitments. In many systems this is a shortcoming. q
Is grievance redress effective? The German Foreign
Office has an official who receives complaints from personnel at all levels
and has high level interface, including access to the Minister. Others have
their own systems, similar in part. Because of the problems of isolation
abroad, it is important to handle this well. q
Does the service practice a rule of the system, or
is it a rule of individuals, variable in application. This is one of the
problems in many developing countries, also affecting morale and performance. |
More
than anyone else, the head of mission (HOM) shapes the embassy through his or
her example, work style and personality. Like the captain of a ship, he has
overall responsibility as well as latent power, as the personal representative
of the head of state, and the leader of the entire “country team” in the nation
of assignment. He is ultimately accountable for the mission’s performance,
taking the credit as well as the blame for particular events, and in terms of
overall performance. And even in an age of instant communication, he faces the
challenges of command. These include functional and mental isolation, personal
responsibility for the wellbeing of all the home-based personnel in the mission
(plus to a lesser extent for the local officials as well), and a frequent need
to depend on his own resources.
The
skills and experience accumulated over the years reach their fruition at this
stage. This is but one of the reasons that career diplomats abhor the notion
that those belonging to other walks of life can be parachuted into
ambassadorial assignments through acts of political patronage. Such non-career
appointments are customary with countries like the US or Latin America or
Africa, and almost unknown in classic diplomacy countries like France, Japan,
Germany and UK.[8] Objectively
speaking, there are very few situations where a non-career ambassador offers
something unique for the advancement of national interest that a career
official deliver. The exceptions hinge on special circumstances when the
political appointee either enjoys special acceptability in the country of assignment,
or has personal influence to get things done at home, or both. But the problem
with “political” influence is that it is transitory; changes in government at
either end can end it abruptly, at considerable embarrassment to the sending
and the receiving state.
The
US system of appointment of distinguished figures from public service as envoys
dates from the earliest days of its Independence — after all five of the first
eight US presidents headed US diplomatic legations abroad before assuming the highest
office.[9]
But soon thereafter it became part of the spoils system of political
appointments, in effect available to anyone, regardless of merit, that had made
a sizable financial contribution to the incumbent president. Of the 160-odd US
ambassadorial appointments abroad (including permanent missions to multilateral
organizations), between 25 to 35% go to people outside the foreign service —
especially the high profile ones in major capitals. Some among them are
respected figures that have achieved prominence in diverse fields, such as
business, academics and public life, unconnected to the president in any way
other than affinity in political values. The US is also unique in placing the
appointments under the ambit of confirmation by the Senate — no other country
has a like procedure. Consequently, reform of the system has often been
considered, but there is no consensus on a formula that would eliminate the
abuse, and retain the positive aspects of the system, including the right of
the president to choose his own team in a constitutional system of delicate
power balance.
A
corollary to the US system is that all ambassadors offer their resignations
when a new president assumes office in Washington DC, including the career
appointees, who are generally not moved out immediately. Most of the political
appointees are replaced as a matter of course, though a few may exceptionally
continue in office, at the pleasure of the new president. For the receiving
state, one merit of getting a political-appointee US ambassador is that he is
likely to have direct access, outside the State Department, to others that
exercise a good deal of influence on the unusually collegial policy-making
process in that country. If they are lucky, he may even have a pipeline to the White
House, or the next best thing, to the National Security Council. Rather few
career-appointees can match this.
A
final word on the ambassador’s bilateral relationship management role that was
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. It demands balanced judgment that
comes with experience and skill. The envoy learns on the job, starting with a
small mission that he may head in a country of relatively low or modest
importance as seen from his home capital. There he hones skills and accumulate
knowledge. Major appointments naturally come towards the end of the career. In
the meantime there are also the opportunities to serve in the foreign ministry,
at increasingly senior levels, building up understanding of one’s own system of
governance, beyond the foreign ministry, that is also connected with a major
mandate abroad. The ambassador needs a combination of knowledge and
comprehension, innovation and caution, courage and discretion, resourcefulness
and the ability to delegate, and above all personal integrity. In a way his
entire career has been an apprenticeship for this role.
Countries
with the strongest tradition of emigration have the largest number of
consulates abroad (these are Italy, France, Portugal, Greece and Spain). The raison
d’etrê of a consulate general or a consulate (the two are identical in
function, but the former ranks higher in the diplomatic hierarchy, and is
usually headed by a more senior official)[10]
is consular work, protection and services for its own nationals living in that
territory, and delivery of visas and other related services to foreign
nationals. They typically function under the jurisdiction of an embassy, though
it is possible to have a consulate even if there is no embassy. This can happen
if an existing embassy is closed, for political reasons or on grounds of
economy. Even suspension of diplomatic relations does not automatically end
consular relations. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1961 is the
international legal framework for these entities, setting out the working
conditions, as well as privileges and immunities.[11]
Non-career
appointees, often nationals of the receiving country, head honorary consulates.
These appointments require the approval of the receiving country, which may
place some conditions on the jurisdiction or even rank.[12]
Some are purely honorific titles, where the appointed individual gives limited
local help to the country that appoints him, and “flies the flag”, with no
financial reimbursement.[13] In other cases the honorary consul may carry
out limited consular work, including issue of visas, for which he may be
reimbursed. For the appointing country it is a device to get the help of
well-connected individuals, at places where it is not viable to station
home-based officials. The crux of the challenge lies in the choice of the
appointee, since at many places there are individuals interested only in the
social status that goes with it, and has little interest in the work. As often
in life, those who actively seek to become honorary consuls are just the kind
that should not be appointed, and the ones that would handle the tasks well
often have to be persuaded to take it up![14]
The
quality that mission officials, including the ambassador, need most of all is a
capacity for teamwork, because solo brilliance is not nearly as effective as
joint effort. The junior official is the foot soldier of the mission, sent off
to any assignment that needs to be done, regardless of formal work allocation.
At the more senior levels, experience and skills are deployed in sectors where
there is need for supervision, as well as autonomous functioning.
How
do the qualities needed in a mission differ fundamentally from those needed at
headquarters? In a word, the role of promotion or “outreach” dominates work abroad,
far more than at home. Each mission official is in effect a proactive salesman
for his country. As for any salesman, this demands intimacy with conditions at
home, and zeal to convey this, in realistic and positive terms.
a) A
winning personality and genuine
engagement in personal outreach. For the junior official, contacts with local officials can often be among the most productive
for the mission. At the local foreign office he can treat desk officers as
equals, and gather information on attitudes and impending developments through
the personal relationships that he establishes. The same applies to any other
ministry or agency that belongs to his direct charge. In some respects he has
no equal in these contact-building and information-gathering roles, because he
is well placed to win confidence and gather material on issues of detail and
nuance that more senior colleagues may find hard to access. The effectiveness
with which the mission’s “outreach” role is performed at all levels depends on
the networking and interpersonal skills of the diplomats. The ambassador is the
one whose personal example inspires all the rest, but officials at all ranks
have to be encouraged and groomed to become valuable mission resources.
b) The
diplomat has a similar role within the
diplomatic corps, also hinging on personal relationships. In each capital
there are usually diverse informal groups of embassy officials, usually “lunch
clubs” where commercial or media specialists and other of like rank meet,
exchange information and engage in professional interchanges (this sense of
fraternity is particularly solid among the military attachés). Sometimes there
is potential for creating a group of like-minded officials of one’s own, with
the right kinds of contacts. (Example: in the 1960s at Beijing I was involved
in the creation of a lunch group composed exclusively of second and third
secretaries that my own HOM came to call as the “Tails of Missions” lunch club.
Now sub-divided into specialist segments – political, economic, etc. — it
survives to the present!)
c) At
all levels, when abroad, he has time to build
up specialist knowledge. The host country is his first target, together
with the local language, if this is the local requirement. For the diplomat,
language is the tool for access and communication, not the end in itself.
Besides the normal knowledge building task of specialization, he also needs an
extensive spread of interests because diplomatic work encompasses ever-wider
subjects. This is the attitude of constant learning.
d) Building
social and representational skills
is another opportunity. Knowledge of wines and fine foods can help, but this is
not the end objective, pleasant as it may be. The professional skill lies more
in a winning way with people and an ability to use social contacts in a
non-obvious manner, for professional purposes. The junior diplomat is the HOM’s
special responsibility in the development of these abilities, starting with
social confidence building.
e) Writing ability
is a career-long preoccupation, together with drafting and summarizing skills.
These are obvious assets in multilateral diplomacy, where the person that can
produce on demand a phrase or other construction of words that bridges
divergent ideas is an instant success in drafting groups. The same skill at
building compromise and safeguarding one’s own interest is no less needed in
bilateral work. It is built through observation, and practice.
f)
A
special project becomes a tremendous learning opportunity for the
mission team. Examples are a special dispatch of importance, or a local market
study on a product of export interest to one’s country, or a scheme to
streamline consular work, or even a new way to transform the library and
periodicals section as a “resource center”. Any of these provide an opportunity
for creative thinking and independent action. The HOM should take care to give
credit to his colleagues for the work, and of course guide them as needed.
g) Technology developments
should be an obvious focus area for the young and the senior official, gaining
personal familiarity with the information and communications technology used,
or potentially usable, by the embassy. One should seek insights into technology
developments in the host country, as a means of remaining well informed on
futuristic subjects.
h) The
embassy official should guard his
sources, especially in written reports, if it might conceivably embarrass
the source if it is traced back. I learn the hard way that an urge to establish
one’s own credibility with details of the source, worked fine until someone at
headquarters was indiscreet enough to name the source to his own foreign
interlocutor, and the story got back to the original source via his foreign
ministry! Practical experience generally shows that besides to one’s own HOM,
one should hold back on sensitive detail.
When
a mission official has an opportunity to officiate as the Chargé d’ Affaires, this is an invaluable learning experience, even
if the times are tranquil and there are no major developments, bilateral or
local. He has the opportunity to mix with other heads of missions, many with
vast experience, and even if he is unlikely to be taken too seriously by them,
he can learn much simply through observation and a passive listening role in
dialogue. He may also gain some insight into the psychological loneliness of
the head of mission, who has none to advise on the way he should act, or react,
to opportunities and developments as they occur, even in this age of instant
communications. He might understand too that the mission is both a branch of
the headquarters, and at the same time a distinct unit in a local environment
—an environment that is not fully understood from headquarters. These are
factors in the complex relationship that he has to sustain with colleagues at
home. He then begins to understand the complete responsibility he must bear for
own actions.
1. Eban,
Abba, Diplomacy for the Next Century
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998).
2. Locke, Mary and Yost, Casimir A eds. Who
Needs Embassies? How US Missions Abroad Help Shape Our World (Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 1997).
3. Rana,
Kishan S, Inside Diplomacy (Manas
Publications, New Delhi, 2000) Chapter 14 pp. 311–42.
4. Wolfe, Robert, ed. Diplomatic Missions:
The Ambassador in Canadian Foreign Policy (McGill & Queens University
Press, Ottawa, 1998).
Questions:
1. What
are the tasks of junior officials in the mission?
2. What
are the work areas to which all embassy officials need exposure and why?
3. How
do the duties of the DCM differ from those of a counselor heading a department
within the mission?
4. List
the major responsibilities of the ambassador. Which one is the hardest of his
tasks?
5. Which
personal qualities are the most important for a diplomat serving in a bilateral
mission?
Notes
[1] This particular phrase comes from an
ambassador interviewed in January 2001, during a survey that I had conducted
for a book on the role of the ambassador that is under preparation.
[2] Exceptions to this are some small
countries in Africa and elsewhere that give diplomatic rank to all home-based
officials. Consequently, the ranks of second and third secretary are reserved
for support staff and the junior-most diplomatic level official is given the
rank of first secretary, even on first appointment.
[3] This pattern applies to well-organized
services, where human resource management is efficient. There are small
services that confront major promotion blockage, which inevitably affects
morale.
[4] The practice on cipher messages usage
varies between countries. Smaller diplomatic service do not use them at all,
while in the very largest almost all communication is through this route and
all diplomats become adept at usage.
[5] My view is based on personal experience
and some will surely not agree. European countries other than UK tend to have a
full time specialist handling the administration, to whom the internal
designation of administration chancellor is applied.
[6] During the course of a survey of
diplomatic practices, I have not encountered any special training or
orientation given in any foreign service on handling the ambassador–DCM
equation. Yet there are generic issues, going beyond the particularities of any
system that demand serious attention to
this problem.
[7] State Department Reforms, report
of the independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2001.
[8] In the majority of Western countries
(besides the US) appointments made from outside the service are rare, but they
do occur. Typically at any point in time there might be one or two such persons
serving as ambassadors. The Indian system is a kind of compromise, with about 8
to 10 non-career ambassadors in place at any given time, out of a total of
about 115.
[9] Right until the end of the 19th
century, in the first 120 years of Independence the US opened only “legations”
in foreign countries, headed by “ministers”. One reason was an aversion to
royal court protocol of Europe of the time; unlike the ambassador, the lower
ranking minister did not from part of the royal court. After the end of the
World War II, this second echelon of diplomatic entities, the legation, has
disappeared from usage.
[10] Usually a consulate general has a larger
jurisdiction than a consulate. The receiving country, in consultation with the
sending country, determines this jurisdiction.
[11] Broadly, consular privileges and
immunities are narrower than diplomatic privileges and immunities, and are more
specifically tied to the actual work performed.
[12] Some receiving countries insist that a
new appointment should be at the rank of “honorary consul”, which may later be
elevated to “honorary consul general”.
[13] Local help may take the shape of looking
after visitors from home, organizing programs for delegations, and assisting
the ambassador and his officials in contacts with local personalities.
[14] In Germany I encountered a situation
where a particular set of individuals assiduously pursued the claim of one
individual, who somehow felt that he was the best person to represent India in
one city. Some years earlier there had been a scandal in another European city
in over an individual who had been innovatively “marketing” such appointments
to local businessmen who craved the status!