Eleven conventions have been ratified on terrorism from 1963 to 1997 in various fields : safety of aviation, aircraft highjacking, acts of aviation sabotage, airports security, civil aviation ; fixed platforms located on the continental shelf , safety of maritime navigation; protection of senior government officials and diplomats ; unlawful taking and use of nuclear material; taking of hostages ; terrorist bombings . These conventions have been ratified by half of the States but only by 25% of the underdeveloped countries.

Four conventions which are not directly aimed at combating Terrorism : Geneva protocol of 1925 and Geneva convention of 1972 on bacteriological weapons ; Paris convention of 1993 on chemical weapons; universal postal convention of 1974.

Finally a Convention on the financing of Terrorism, which is a French proposal, is approved on the 12 of September 1999. Two other projects are under discussion in the U.N.: one Russian project on Nuclear Terrorism and one Indian on International Terrorism.

MAIN INSTRUMENTS
General
1937 - Convention on the prevention and punishment of terrorism
1965 - Declaration Against Intervention
1972 - Declaration of 7 Principles

Air-transport
Tokyo Convention - 1963
Hague Convention - 1970 - introduces principle of extradition
Montreal Convention - 1971

Regional
American Convention against terrorism (adopted by the Organisation of American States)- 1971
European Convention against terrorism (adopted by the Council of Europe) - 1977

UN - Resolution (General Assembly)
Resolution 3034 (XXVII) - 18.12.1972
Resolution 31/102 - 15.12.1976
Resolution 32/147 - 16.12.1978

Soft Law

Declaration, resolutions and other non-legal forms were used a lot in response to "11.09". They are considered as a part of soft law. Here is definition of soft law:
Agreements on principles with little official legal security. Often these agreements are laid down in declarations, charters, and so forth that reflect ethical conceptions that have not yet found their way into law. Soft law is becoming important, since judges are starting to use soft law principles as a basis for their rulings. The development of soft law has been strongly stimulated by a number of global conferences and summits, like the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the Social Summit in Copenhagen, the Women conference in Beijing and the conference on Demography in Cairo. Source

Self-defense
What is self-defense?

What if attack is not conducted by other state (case 11.09)?
An argument can be made, however, that the principle of article 51 could extend to such a case if the government is knowingly harboring the terrorists

•UN
article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Thus, if the coordinated use of force to hijack and use large airliners loaded with fuel to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon can be classified as an armed attack against the United States, and if it is necessary to take countermeasures involving the use of armed force in order to prevent further attacks, the United States arguably could use force under article 51 until such time as the Security Council can act to maintain international peace and security.

•NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) parties, by invoking article 5 of that Treaty, have expressed their understanding that an armed attack against the United States occurred. Article 5 requires the NATO parties to assist the attacked country in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter, but it does not specify the action to be taken. It does say that the action could involve the use of armed force.

Extradition
Between January 1960 and June 1976, 20 States requested extradition of 78 hijackers but this was granted only in five cases, through 42 of the offenders were prosecuted by the recipient state.

Extradition is one of the primary instruments that should enable that terrorists are brought to justice even when they slip across frontiers. The question of extradition is addressed in the main international legal instruments. The main principle is that state should bring perpetuator of terrorist act to justice in two ways either by prosecution under domestic law or through extradition.

•Survey conventions
CONVENTION REGULATION OF EXTRADITION

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1973) text Article 8
1.The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2.If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3.Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4.Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) and (d).

•Grey zone
States are usually reluctant to extradite:
- nationals of the requested state
- political offenders

- aut dedere aut judicaire
This principle imposes an obligation on the state on whose territory an alleged offender is found, to submit the case to the appropriate authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless it decides instead of extradite him.
Surce: DiploAcademy, 2003.

Differences and similarities between the rhetoric used by terrorists online and elsewhere. We can reveal differences and similarities between the rhetoric used by terrorists online and elsewhere. A central issue for terrorist rhetoric, regardless of the medium it uses, is the need to justify and legitimize violence. Many of the arguments used by terrorists online - the "last resort" argument, the "legal" argument and shifting the responsibility to the use of violence to the enemies of the terrorists - are found elsewhere in terrorists materials. The similarity between the materials used by terrorist groups online and in the conventional media is further manifested by the fact that much of the content of the sites actually makes use of materials that have been previously circulated elsewhere (e.g., press releases). However, the content of terrorist organizations Internet sites is different in many ways from the content of mass-media coverage of terrorism. First and foremost, news coverage of terrorists is almost always related to violence, whereas violence can easily be concealed over the Internet. Thus, the sites try in many ways to appear like the websites of legitimate political organizations. In other words, the Internet terrorist rhetoric seems much more "pacifist" than the rhetoric used by media-oriented terrorism. Some Internet pages deny the use of violence (which is the exact opposite of the typical terrorist strategy of taking responsibility). Others simply try to ignore it. Instead, the creators of the sites highlight issues like political detention and freedom of expression, probably with the intent of winning the sympathy of human rights and free speech-oriented web surfers. A second difference between the content of the sites and media coverage of terrorists is that the sites contain extensive information and background, not possible on mass media channels that operate with more limited space constraints. An abundance of background information and documents characterize the websites of a variety of other non-terrorist political organizations. Like political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and interest groups, the creators of the sites perceive the Internet as an opportunity to supply interested surfers with an information storehouse. Indeed, this capability might be more important for terrorists than for other political users of the Internet because the access of adherents of the groups to such materials is often restricted by authorities. A third difference between CMC and conventional media is that by using the sites, the organizations can mobilize people into action, something they cannot do through the mainstream media because of journalistic standards. However, although the sites offered visitors ample and varied possibilities to action, violence was rarely one of the advocated approaches. The sites call visitors to donate, disseminate the organizations' messages, and protest. Call for violent action, if at all present, was only indirect (e.g., through calls for Jihad in Islamic sites). The reasons for the differences between terrorist sites and the coverage of terrorism in the mainstream media have to do with the communicators, the channel, and the audience. The communicators of online information are probably more educated and more familiar with the nature of the Internet than other members of the terrorist organizations. The channel - the Internet- is a central venue for free speech. The communicators try to accommodate the message to the values and norms of the medium. In addition, they are probably influenced by existing Internet formats; thus, the similarity to the Internet sites of political organizations and the more pacifistic nature of the messages, compared to regular terrorist rhetoric. The communicators perceptions of the audience prob-ably also irfluence the contents. Web users are perceived to be international, educated, and mostlty liberal thus. the human rights discourse and the references to international organization. How should governments respond? Should societies try to restrict the online pres-ence of terorist groups? Future prevention of distribution of terrorist content on the Internet is technologically problematic, legally complex (Karniel, 1997; Oberding & Norder-haug, 1996) and ethically indricate. Moreover, it does not seem at all probable that the effort here is worthwhile for the authorities, as the damage inherent in the sites, in terms of public relations, is less than the possible damage arising from attempts to restrict them (limitation of freedom of expression, invasion of an "open" channel such as the Internet, etc.). Attempts by individual hackers as well as by governments to block the organizations from using the Internet were reported (Shahar, 2001), especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks. While monitoring the websites of terrorist organizations in the past four years the authors found that many of them change addresses frequently. Some sites disappeared from the network for a while (as happened to all Hizbollah sites in October 2000 after an attack by Israeli hackers in response to the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers); however, these attacks affected the sites' presence on the Internet only temporarily. The fact that most of these sites reopened after a while demonstrates the futility of attempts to block terrorists or their supporters from using the Internet to communicate their messages.

Criminal Law This guide contains links to Internet resources and documents in the area of federal criminal law, as well as providing links to other guides and directories which contain material on State and Territory and overseas law. More detailed guides are also provided for topics of current interest to the federal Parliament.

The most common content of the surveyed sites is information. They usually include information about the history of the organization and biographies of its leaders, founders, heroes, commanders or revered personalities, information on the political and ideological aims of the organization, and up-to-date-news. Most of the sites give a detailed historical account of the movement or the organization, a review of the social and political background, a selective description of its notable activities in the past, and its aims. National organizations (separatist or territorial) generally display maps of the areas in dispute: the Hamas site shows a map of Palestine; the Colombian site shows a map of Colombia; the Zapatista site has a map of Chiapas and information about it; the Tamil site presents a map of Sri Lanka. Almost all the terror sites detail their goals in one way or another. Sometimes this is done explicitly, sometimes indirectly. Sometimes it is a separate section, and sometimes intermixed with other content. The most common presentation of aims is through a direct criticism of their enemies or rivals. For example, the Hamas site presents a historical account of "the birth of the Zionist entity in Palestine;" the Shining Path site has information about "the crimes of the Fujimori regime" (supported by the United States); a considerable part of the Hizbollah site focuses on Israeli activity ("Israeli terrorism" from the Hizbollah standpoint); the Tamil site attacks the Sinhalese regime. Thus, the terrorist sites do not concentrate only on information concerning their organizations; direct attack of the enemy is the most common strategy of the Internet terrorists. By contrast, almost all sites avoid presenting and detailing their violent activities. Although the organizations behind these sites have a record of bloodshed, they hardly ever record these activities on their sites. The exceptions are Hizbollah and Hamas. Hizbollah shows updated statistical reports of its actions ("daily operations") that display in minute detail all of the organization's operational successes. A separate page enumerates the number of dead "martyrs," along with the number of "Israeli enemies" and "collaborators" killed. The Hamas site contains lengthy discussions in Arabic of military "operations" in its news and views sections. However, this detailed depiction of violent action is unusual. Most organizations, even if they expound at length on the moral (and, as some of them argue, legal) basis of the legitimacy of the use of violence, refrain from any reference to their violent actions or their fatal consequences. This reticence probably reflects the propaganda and image-building motives of the sites. While avoiding the violent aspects of their activities, the Internet terrorists, regardless of their nature, motives or location, usually stress two issues: freedom of expression and political prisoners. Thus, the Tamil Tigers discuss the legislation of the Sri Lankan government that limits freedom of expression "in support of the establishment of a separate state on the land of Sri Lanka;" the Kahane Lives site calls on visitors to oppose the legal ban on activity of the organization (in the United States and Israel); the issues of freedom of expression and restrictions on political activity are central themes on the site of the Basque Hari Batsuna; and the Colombian ELN site discusses limited freedom of expression extensively ("Contrary to what official sources state, there is no freedom of the press or of expression in Colombia. . . . The Sampar government operates censorship and is tightening its hold on the media. . . . Moreover, critical journalists are victims of death and torture. . . . Every week attacks are made against the journal of the Communist Party"). It appears that anti-establishment terror enjoys representing itself as the victim, appealing to the democratic values of the Western public in general and Internet users in particular. Terrorists aim at Western audiences who are sensitive to the norms of freedom of expression and emphasize the issues that provoke sympathy in democratic societies. Restricted expression by political movements is contrary to the fundamental and sacred principles of democracy. The strong emphasis given to this issue in democratic societies helps terrorist organizations—which don the innocent cap of a "nonviolent political group"—embarrass the governments against which they are struggling. This tactic works particularly well on the stage of the Internet, the symbol of absolutely free communication. As noted earlier, another piece of information frequently found on terrorists' websites is that of political detentions. The FARC site talks in terms of "the cry of women political prisoners"; political prisoners is a subject that often appears on the site of the Kurdish movement and the Palestinian sites; the DHKP/C site deals at length with the hunger strike of political prisoners and the torture they endure (which "will not be able to break the human spirit"); a report on the condition of political prisoners in Peru and calls for their liberation may be found at the Tupak Amaru site; the Kahane site condemns administrative detentions and even presents an interview from prison with Benyamin Zeev Kahane; the Hari Batsuna site mentions the detention of party activists who distributed a cassette produced by ETA, the military arm of the movement, "calling for a peaceful solution to the crisis of the Basque region." Carlos Marighela in his manual for the urban guerrilla states that one of his strategies is to push the authorities to act in a way that will make them hated by the citizens. The themes of political detention and restricted freedom of expression are used for this purpose. The organizations' websites emphasize the antidemocratic measures employed against them. In so doing, they attempt to malign the authorities, appealing both to their supporters ("constituents") as well as to more remote audiences of "bystanders." Even among the community of their "enemies." namely the public that is naturally hostile to the organization, the terrorists try, by emphasizing the threats to democracy, to create feelings of uneasiness and shame. The terrorist sites are made up not only of text, but are also rich in graphic and visual elements. All of them display their emblems on their homepages. Some of the sites even offer visitors the option of downloading the emblems. Although the Internet sites usually conceal the violent nature of the terror organizations and stress their allegedly peace-loving nature, this pacifist approach is not reflected in their emblems. Symbols on the websites' homepages usually include weapons or other elements signifying the use of force. Hizbollah shows a knife with dripping blood; the Shining Path and the IRA display masked fighters brandishing weapons; at the Kahane Lives site there is a raised fist; and at the Tupak Amaru and ELN sites a rifle is held aloft. Some of these symbols originated long before the Internet and thus do not reflect the new trend of a nonviolent image. The flags of the organization (or similar national symbols) also appear regularly on the sites' front pages. (Incidentally, some sites are designed in the colors of the flags.) The 2002 sites contain many other nontextual elements—songs, speeches, and even video clips. These are usually more common on non-English sites. A common element on the terror sites is the organization's communiques and the speeches and writings of its leaders, founders, and ideologists. The sites often present a word-for-word series of official statements by the organizations, which the visitor can browse through, along with selected announcements arranged by date. Tupak Amaru and the Zapatistas offer such communiques and even call on visitors to copy, translate, print, and distribute them ("They are the work of the central command and the site has no copyright"); the DHKP/C site offers speeches and translations of chapters from a book by one of its leaders; the Hamas site offers links to translations of interviews given by Sheikh Yassin to Arab radio stations and newspapers; the Shining Path offers access to pamphlets by the organization's spokespeople; the FARC site allows access to press announcements and letters; Kahane Lives gives a commentary on the weekly Torah portion by Benyamin Zev Kahane. In general, the Internet sites of terrorists tend to recycle materials distributed in the past through the mass media and other communication means. Some terrorist sites house a veritable online gift shop through which visitors can order and purchase books, video and audio cassettes, stickers, printed shirts, and pins with the organization's badges.

Whom do the Internet terrorists target at their sites? Are they appealing to potential supporters, to their enemies (namely the public who is part of the opposing sociopolitical community in the conflict), or are they targeting international public opinion? Although it is impossible for us to identify the actual users of the sites, an analysis of their contents indicates an attempt to approach all three audiences. Reaching out to supporters is evinced from the fact that the sites offer appropriate items for sale, including printed shirts, badges, flags, and video and audio cassettes. The slogans at these sites also appeal strongly to the supporter public. Of course, the sites in local languages target these audiences more directly. These sites include much more detailed information about recent activities of the organizations and elaborate in detail about internal politics (the relationship between local groups). But an important target audience, in addition to supporters of the organizations, is the international "bystander" public and surfers who are not involved in the conflict. This is evident from the presentation of basic information about the organization and the extensive historical background material (with which the supporter public is presumably familiar). Similarly, the sites make use of English in addition to the local language of the organization's supporters. Most of the sites offer versions in several languages in order to enlarge their international audience. The Basque movement site offers information in Castilian, German, French, and Italian; the MRTA site offers Japanese and Italian in addition to its English and Spanish versions. The Uzbek site offers information in Arabic, English, and Russian. Judging from the content of many of the sites, it might also be inferred that journalists constitute another bystander target audience. Press releases by the organizations are often placed on the websites. The detailed background information might also be useful for international reporters. One of Hizbollah's sites (Hizbollah's press office) specifically addresses journalists and invites them to interact with the organization's press office via e-mail. Approaches to the "enemy" audiences are not as clearly apparent from the content of many sites. However, in some sites the desire to reach this audience is evident by the efforts lo demoralize the enemy or to create feelings of guilt. When the terror sites show pictures of their enemies performing acts of killing, enemy police aiming their weapons it women and children, or evidence of torture of detainees by those enemies, they are meant not only to mobilize support and to promote sympathy among neutral visitors, but also to arouse feelings of unease, guilt, and remorse in audiences belonging to the opposing political or social group. The organizations try to use the websites to change public opinion in their enemies' states, to weaken public support for the governing regime, to stimulate public debate, and of course, to demoralize the enemy. From the words of the Hizbollah leader quoted at the beginning of this article it can be gathered that the movement indeed wishes to enter "the homes of Israelis, creating an important psychological breakthrough." In 1999, Hizbollah succeeded in this goal when, on its Internet site, it showed details about the return of the bodies of Israeli marine commandoes who had fallen in Lebanon. The organization stated that the one returned coffin contained not only the body of one of the fallen soldiers, Itamar Ilya, but also body parts of other fighters. The statement aroused a furor among the families of the dead soldiers and a bitter confrontation with the IDF authorities. The "dialogue" that the Hizbollah organization wants to open with the Israelis by means of the Internet is also evident in the inclusion of appeals to the parents of Israeli soldiers stationed in Lebanon (with publication of an interview originally aired in Israel with four mothers of Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, under the headline "I don't want my son to die in Lebanon"). In an article in Yediot Aharouot (16 December 1998, 7) many Israelis, particularly parents of soldiers serving in Lebanon, reported that they visit the Hizbollah site to get an update on the news ("I regard these sites as a legitimate source of information," said one Israeli father). The Hizbollah site even offers to answer anyone who sends questions by e-mail, and does indeed reply to Israeli questioners, sending information and news to their e-mail addresses. Do the terror organizations try to enroll supporters through the network? Analysis of the sites revealed a few attempts to enlist new recruits into an active circle of support, but there was no attempt to mobilize visitors for any actual violence. Kahane Lives (in which the suggestion appears under the title "How can I help the struggle: A few suggestions"); the Shining Path ("Action alert: What you can do"); the Basque movement; and the IRA site seeking economic support (including a page for contributions through credit cards) are examples of pages seeking readers' active support. The Zapatista site calls on its visitors to assist the struggle in several ways: to approach members of the Mexican government (the site offers links to the e-mail address of the president of Mexico), and to "send letters of support to ENLZ or local refugees. Educate your friends. . . . Join protest marches outside embassies or diplomatic missions of Mexico near you, or organize such a rally yourself. . . . Send humanitarian aid to Mexico (link to humanitarian organizations). . . . Donate money to the organization." In contrast to the absence of appeals for active violence, there is a highly conspicuous effort at many terror sites to obtain supporters for nonviolent activity, especially through the signing of petitions. Though no direct calls for violence were found, some of the content on the websites could be viewed as encouraging violence indirectly. The Hamas site included calls for Jihad ("Jihad is victory or martyrdom," "an eye for an eye," "the Jihad will continue till judgment day"). Of course, the legitimization and justification of violence can also be interpreted as an indirect call for violence. Glorification of martyrs (and the very use of the word "martyr"), for example, signals that the perpetrators of violence are rewarded. However, as mentioned earlier, this is only the subtext. Most sites' contents ignore violence, and some of the organizations even imply that they seek nonviolent solutions. Another activity frequently suggested by the terror sites to their visitors is to navigate to other web pages through links appearing on the site. The sites provided are usually those ideologically close to the organization (its journals, its solidarity groups, etc.). In addition, links can be found to organizations offering information on subjects related to topics of interest to the terror groups—human rights bodies in the case of some of the revolutionary organizations; Islamic groups in the case of the Islamic and Palestinian sites; nationalist movements in the case of groups engaged in political struggle (e.g., the Hamas site to the Pal-Net Palestinian site).