BUILDING POLITICAL RELATIONS

(Source: Chapter 2. from the publication “Bilateral Diplomacy” by Kishan Rana)

 

 

Under the UN Charter that was framed at San Francisco in 1945 at the end of World War II, the new organization’s 50 founder member-states undertook the commitment to safeguard peace and security. As the process of decolonization subsequently unfolded, every state that gained freedom sought UN membership as one of its first acts, in assertion of an independent international personality. This has made the UN a uniquely universal international organization.[1] In accordance with the UN Charter and the basic tenets of international law, the presumption is that friendship and a willingness to cooperate animates foreign relationships between different countries around the world. In addition factors such as shared interest, subscription to common ideals, and mutual benefit in external cooperation within and across regions and continents, guide countries. All these elements contribute to building strong, mutually advantageous foreign relations. While situations of tension and conflict exist among some countries, the basic presumption is that all states seek good relationships around the world. In practice, how is the task implemented? Is there what may be called a standard methodology for relationship building?

 

Concepts & Goals

 

It is perhaps only a state charting out its foreign policy course at independence that asks itself such basic questions, but it is pertinent to carry out from time to time a kind of “zero base” examination of one’s own external relationships. One way to carry this out is to reassess one’s interest in a particular country and examine how this matches actual actions on the ground. Another approach is to examine the concepts that underlie different sets of relationships. The concepts may include:

 

A.      Security objectives. National security is the country’s first priority shaping its external relations. This will determine the way one deals with neighboring countries, or with potential rivals, or with countries that are antagonistic. Security factors also enter the calculation in dealings with great powers.

B.     Neighborhood. This is a powerful factor, shaping relations even when security factors do not dominate. Proximity works in a complex manner; handled well, it becomes a platform for cooperation. At other times it leads to rivalry and contestation. The management of relationships with neighboring countries is invariably the first diplomatic challenge.

C.     Shared ideals. Values or “ideology” (though this particular term is not much in fashion after the demise of the Soviet Union and the “socialist bloc”) are another factor. Among post-colonial, developing countries, commitment to Non-Alignment and the economic goals of the G-77 group, plus South–South cooperation, can serve as a principle-based connection. After the end of the Cold War, Non-Alignment as a “Movement” has lost steam, though it continues as a forum for Third World countries sharing some common interests.[2] Religion has been seen as another unifying factor by some states, such as those belonging to the Islamic faith.[3] In practice, such commonalities by themselves are not a powerful basis for mutually beneficial relations, but they serve as a useful starting point.

D.     Mutual antagonism. Regional rivalry, ethnic factors, history, and antipathy can shape relationships in an adversarial fashion, even among those that are not neighbors. But in today’s dynamic post-Cold War world, enemies of the past can become cooperative partners, even while mutual wariness persists.

E.     Matching interests. Mutuality of interests is usually a strong basis for a lasting relationship; the more so if these shared interests are of a durable character. This may comprise of economic factors such as a good and expanding level of trade, or investments, or need to work together for exploiting a shared resource.

F.      Legacy. Whether through past colonial or other contact, or shared culture, religion or language, inherited connections provide a good base for affirmative relationship building. Such elements provide depth and weight at popular levels. The ties between France and its former colonies in Africa are one example.

G.    Momentum. The development of a relationship becomes a valuable asset, like a “virtuous circle”, in that positive actions create new opportunity for further relationship growth. The reverse is also true and negative developments can create a vicious cycle of downturn, which can be broken only through determined initiative.

H.     Diversity. A mature relationship is identified by diversified contacts, which permit flexibility and accommodation for differences. The opposite situation is uni-dimensional ties where a single issue can lead to crisis in the entire relationship. India’s relationship with the US in the past belonged to the latter category, when divergence over the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) led to a serious downturn in ties. The past decade has seen a maturing of mindsets, where one set of differences are not allowed to hurt progress in other cooperative areas.[4]

 

In bilateral diplomacy, identification of commonalities lies at the heart of relationship building, the more so in situations where commonalities are not obvious. Countries best respond to one another on the basis of how the other can help fulfill their own objectives, not through abstract principles, nor as a reaction to the logic of an argument presented by the other country. Principles and logic are the idioms in which states speak to one another, but the foundation of relationships is self-interest. In practice, identification of commonality is a dynamic process, depending on elements like the opportune moment, presentation of the arguments, and the persuasion applied, i.e. the full range diplomatic advocacy.

 

Developing Relations

 

Let us assume that diplomatic relations exist and resident missions have been exchanged (or arrangements worked out for concurrent accreditation, or even to have “non-resident” envoys, who may be stationed in the home country and operate out of there).[5] The standard methods for cultivating relationships at a political level consist of the following:

 

i.                     Initiation of contacts usually marks the start of new relationships, as for example immediately after independence. The first steps may include cautious probing of intentions, and contacts to measure the level of interest, and evaluation of practical prospect for mutually beneficial links. Such informal exchanges that may have taken place prior to formal relations are consolidated and renewed at this stage. Depending on assessment, this may lead to an exchange of resident envoys, or concurrent accreditation.[6]

ii.                   Dialogue and Exchanges of visits at various levels are always useful. These may range from exploratory missions, dialogue at functional or official levels, to visits by ministers, going all the way to visits by heads of state and government. Each move of this kind is preceded by a careful assessment of the benefits that are expected to accrue, and the objectives to be realized. Other factors that enter the calculation include the pattern of past exchanges, reciprocity, and of course the other competing priorities. A landmark summit encounter event is often celebrated with a joint statement or communiqués, but when there are frequent encounters between heads, informal protocol rules are applied, with focus on dialogue and not on ceremony (see Chapter 10).

iii.                  Agreements covering new areas of cooperation are both the end product of expanding relationships and a platform for stronger subsequent actions. Sometimes agreements are concluded in areas of peripheral interest, simply to add to the appearance of closeness, or decorate a visit with an outward image of substance. Usually this is of little value. Experience shows that new agreements or protocols are worthwhile if substantive result is expected, not empty gestures. Accords that are not implemented can become an embarrassment in the future, and also undermine the credibility of interlocutors.

iv.                 Consultation mechanisms are another useful device to signal serious intent to work closely, and produce results. These range from Joint Commissions meeting annually, often led by Ministers on each side, usually covering economic issues. Another method is “joint consultations” between foreign ministries, at the level of Permanent Secretaries or even Foreign Ministers, where bilateral ties are reviewed, new initiatives launched, and the dossiers that may have been blocked, pushed to conclusion. Another method is the creation of special groups of independent “eminent persons” drawn from different walks of life, to advise both governments on further ways to improve ties (Chapter 9).

v.                   Cooperation in functional areas is yet another means of moving relationships forward. This may cover exchanges in culture, the media, education, science & technology, and “sister city” or inter-regional relationships. They involve official agencies as also non-State participants, and the latter is of increasing importance in an age when foreign relations are no longer the monopoly of the State. Countries like Germany, France, and Poland have demonstrated the way in which strong people-to-people bonds can be created, overcoming past history and ethnic stereotypes. The steps include massive programs of youth exchanges, and links among grass-root organizations in virtually all fields, ranging from administrative entities that lie along the frontiers, to facilities for border populations to attend schools in the neighboring country and to learn one another’s language.[7]

vi.                 Regional cooperation has emerged as a strong trend, binding neighboring countries into networks that jointly pursue trade concessions, or establish a free trade area, or cooperation in other areas like economic development, transport, resource exploitation and the like. A good bilateral relationship acts as a building block for mutually beneficial regional activities.

 

New initiatives are productive when they are well prepared, and take advantage of the right window of opportunity. The reputation that a country creates for its astuteness in the implementation of its foreign policy, i.e. diplomacy, is also a factor that contributes to success.

 

 

Japan’s Cultivation of Myanmar *

 

Japan’s cultivation of Myanmar in 1998–2000 provides an interesting case study. Having determined that the continuing isolation of that country’s military regime was not to advantage the advantage of its’ Asia policy, Tokyo implemented a series of measures. Initially, careful soundings were made in Washington DC, to put across its objectives to this vital ally, to explain what was virtually the first independent initiative. The US was not convinced, but Japan decided to go ahead anyway. A conference of some 40 scholar-specialists on Myanmar was organized jointly with UK at the foreign policy think tank Wilton Park. Noting that experts regarded the policy of isolating the military junta of Myanmar as locked in an impasse, and no one had an alternative for breaking the deadlock between that regime and the democratic forces represented by Nobel peace laureate Aung San Su Chi, Japan concluded that Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN, and its own Asian interests justified a policy of measured cultivation.

 

Aid that had been blocked earlier was released, and food aid was imitated. A direct air link between Tokyo and Yangon (formerly called Rangoon) was launched by a Japanese airline. Former premier Hashimoto made a visit as a special envoy in October 1999, and this was followed by a business delegation that was received exceptionally well by the Myanmar authorities. The process also served the larger purpose articulating an autonomous foreign policy directly serving its interests.

 

* A visiting Tokyo University professor narrated this account in 1999–2000 at a closed-door seminar in New Delhi.

 

 

Practical Methods

 

Political cultivation operates on decision and direction by headquarters and is usually implemented by the diplomatic mission, or by roving envoys, special delegations, or even directly by the foreign ministry, depending on circumstances. In most cases the resident mission is the prime implementing agency, operating under supervision by the headquarters. From the perspective of the embassy, this process is influenced by a number of practical steps that include:

 

A.       An understanding of the power structure in the target country, identification of the principal players, and all forms of related “intelligence”, which is no more than close analysis of the ground situation, and determination of the tactical route that is best suited to one’s own needs.

B.      Information management is a key ingredient, related to the above. The Internet and a multiple of openly available databases make information collection very easy, but focus on relevant material and good analysis based on this are harder. Pertinent information along with objective analysis is the basis of sound diplomatic reportage.

C.      Creating a web of contacts, friends, and allies, and continually building on this, in a proactive manner. The work is incremental, and continuous, but each door opened often leads to another. Networking is a vital instrument of diplomacy. The diplomat engaged in the task has to place in wide context his own role in this process, and avoid personal ego. He or she must pass on contacts to successors, since such work is part of a continuum.

D.      In any capital, big or small, embassies are engaged in a real competition for access, in which good results may be determined by diverse factors, ranging from social entertainment to personal credibility, ingenuity and chance. Serendipity is always one of the biggest allies of the diplomat. The application of method and purpose to representational entertainment is vital, but so are other elements like social skills and ability to offer something exceptional, be it cuisine, company or style. The spouse, who used to be overlooked or taken for granted, can be crucial in contact-creation.[8] The diplomatic spouses merit attention from the diplomatic service, and one of the new motivation devices is to pay a special allowance, to encourage the spouse to accompany the diplomat to the foreign assignment.[9]

E.      Notions of status and level of contacts particularly affect ambassadors, and this applies as well to visiting delegations. Deliberate slights (or protocol mistreatment) have to be considered carefully and dealt with as a form of non-verbal communication by the other partner. But we live in an age when functional factors are more important than outward form, even in this protocol-driven profession. Access and good communication routes should take precedence over status and form.

F.       Between headquarters and the mission, and within the mission, political outreach hinges on a team approach. Notwithstanding the internal division of work, all members of an embassy form the “country team”, but in the real world conflicts over jurisdiction are common.

G.      The Diplomatic Corps is virtually an association, even a brotherhood, with its own code of behavior and rites. In the larger capitals, even more vital than the Corps that may include 150 ambassadors or more, are the regional sub-groups. These offer a unique platform for information sharing, analysis, and sometimes even for joint action in the name of a regional entity like SADC or ASEAN, and for promotional outreach. One can join such groups at various levels such as first secretary or counselor, or create one’s own group, depending on local circumstance, if there is a vacuum or suitable opportunity.

H.      The old tools of persuasion and negotiation skill remain the principal weapons in the diplomat’s armory. To these professional skills should be added the instruments of integrated diplomacy, the ability to identify trade-offs and cross-linkages, which can help in determining shared interests, and creating “win–win” situations for both sides. Armed with information, one can search for opportunities to offer to the other side something it seeks, linking this with some action or accommodation that is to one’s own advantage. This is the diplomatic doctrine of “linkage” and “leverage”.

I.          It is invariably better to focus on creating institutional connections between counterparts of the two countries, even while the role of individuals is crucial in identifying and forming these links. This permits the relationship to move to a more stable platform, beyond personalities. Institutions outlast individuals.

 

Former Canadian Ambassador to the US (1987–93), Alan Gotlieb has written about his experience in implementing the theory of “multiplicity of instruments”, i.e. functional contacts between Canadian and US counterparts, which are multiple and self-interested, as the “backbone of the relationship.”[10] He notes that this went against the notion of centralized control in the Department of External Relations. “Management of the relationship became the buzzword.” This sums up the formula for intensive bilateral cultivation.

 

Cultivation Targets

 

Viewed primarily from the perspective of the resident mission, the main targets in the process of building political partners are a bit different today from the past when the focus was primarily on the MFA of the partner country and a narrow circle of authoritative official agencies. The age of public diplomacy has widened the target range.

 

a)      The local MFA remains the first contact point, and the mission needs contacts with it at all working levels. In most capitals the ambassador can meet the foreign minister rather rarely, but good contacts with the permanent head, the permanent secretary or the state secretary, and with the political director, and the territorial division head serve very well. This kind of cultivation depends on subjective factors, personal credibility and professional competence. Even when the MFA is bypassed, as may be appropriate in some circumstance, it is crucial to keep the prime interlocutors there informed — the territorial division, and the functional divisions vital to one’s own interests, plus the other key players.

b)      The offices of the heads of state and government are the other prime targets. In contemporary practice, the resident envoy finds it difficult to access the heads themselves, save in exceptional circumstance. (Example: Professor Galbraith, as the US Ambassador sent by Kennedy to New Delhi had written with wit about his direct access to Nehru in the early 1960s, but such exceptional times and personalities are rare.[11] There are many Western capitals where all but the envoys of great powers have much difficulty in meeting even the foreign minister.) But working contacts with the officials in the offices of high dignitaries serves a like purpose. The key is ability and clout to get one’s viewpoint across whenever needed, sometimes at very short notice, without abusing access.

c)      Contacts at the other ministries depend on the density of dialogue and functional need. Broad cultivation of all major agencies of the government is part of basic outreach, but has to be linked to potential for cooperation. This requires involvement of the entire embassy team, with each diplomat covering a cluster of agencies, at appropriate levels.

d)      The parliament is a traditional diplomatic partner, and more important now than ever before, not only because various parliamentary committees engage in detailed examination of issues like foreign affairs, trade policy and aid, but also as there is a general trend towards their deeper involvement in foreign affairs. (Like the involvement of non-State actors, this is part of the “democratization” of foreign affairs that is visible in many countries.) Bi-national parliamentary friendship groups are special entities that play a role through exchanges of visits by parliamentary delegations. In the US and at the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission, plus at the European Parliament at Strasbourg, many countries use lobbyists, as a routine means of influencing regulations and gaining support, much as such activities are “unconventional” (and not anticipated by the Vienna Convention of 1961). One observer has estimated that in the early 1990s Japan spent a total of $ 250 annually on lobbying, directly in hiring them, plus cultivation through think tanks, institutions and the like.[12]

e)      The media, print and electronic, demand in many places local language ability for daily monitoring. Negative publicity is the routine bugbear of the diplomat, but the knee-jerk reaction of countering this with counter-publicity or “refutation” is seldom productive — though it may be inescapable in certain types of situations. The creation of positive publicity is the more effective route for image building, which is now — or should be — a constant preoccupation of embassies.

f)        Business is a prime cultivation target today, directly in terms of reaching out to the major individual enterprises (both those with sizable business interests in the relationship and those that offer future potential), plus the business and industry associations. No less vital are medium and small companies that play a special role in bilateral trade, technology and investments. All embassy officials, regardless of tasks performed, should be seen as contributors to economic diplomacy. For example, the consular official needs to be sensitive to the visa needs of businessmen, meet them personally if opportunity arises and share with the economic sections the data on business visitors, to act as a contributor to economic diplomacy. The same is true of the officials dealing with media or culture sectors.

g)      The think tanks, academia, the science & technology community, the social and volunteer organizations and the NGOs, all the elements of civil society that have a special affinity or interest in one’s own country are part of the new public outreach. They should be cultivated in sustained fashion by designated officials, with the personal involvement of the ambassador. The utilization of all public speaking opportunities is equally vital, to reach out and build favorable constituencies.

h)      Ethnic communities deserve special attention, especially those from one’s own country. In plural, open and democratic societies, they may be in a position to directly influence the local political process. (Example: the pervasive Jewish lobby in the US represents Israel’s trump card in that country). Even when present in small numbers, ethnic communities are useful sources of information and contact.

 

Managing Complexity

 

The issues in diplomatic dialogue are more diverse than ever, and so is the range of players who are engaged in bilateral external relationships — representing different branches of government as also non-State actors. We live in an interdependent world, whose leit motif is globalization, even while many see this as a mixed benefit, one that sharpens the divide between the haves and the have-nots. For foreign ministries and for missions, diplomacy has become a matter of complexity management. Part of that complexity also involves dealing with many kinds of technical experts. The diplomat, whose special knowledge can almost never cover the range of technical issues he encounters, has to grasp the essentials of diverse disciplines, and place these within the integral context of the bilateral relationship with that country. He must also acquire the skill of making inter-connections wherever possible, to find leverage or “trade-offs”. This is the crux of his professional skill, an ability to interact with experts, understand the essentials of technical issues under dialogue, and relate these to the totality of the relationship.

 

In bilateral relationships a crisis can emerge through diverse reasons, some of which can be exogenous. No standardized set of responses can be stipulated, but in handling such situations there are elements that can be taken into account, for safeguarding relations and for reducing adverse impact.

 

a)      Diversified relationships show greater resilience than those that are not. In the latter, a single issue can dominate and cause a crisis that embitters the entire relationship. Conversely, one of the challenges of relationship management is to prevent single theme domination in periods of adversity. This can be seen in the experience of many countries. For example, in contrast to the earlier mono–theme India–US relationship narrated above, China and the US, after overcoming decades of mutual hostility, have shown a capacity to compartmentalize differences, and prevent them from poisoning cooperation in other areas.

b)      Equally, spreading contacts across different constituencies, political and functional, is a way of minimizing the impact of crisis. This applies in particular to situations of radical change of government. It is a form of political insurance. This is visible in the relations between countries of West Europe, where sharp divergences in social philosophy and domestic policy do not affect ties between conservative and social democrat governments.

c)      Calculations of long-term interest are important when determining responses during a crisis, to avoid foreclosing future options or prolonging damage. This may entail for the foreign ministry the adoption of unpopular standpoints at a time of popular upsurge or hostility towards an external partner. As the saying goes, there are no permanent friends abroad, only permanent interests.

 

The Vienna Convention remains the framework for diplomatic work, but the content or tasks performed has expanded. An expanded definition of diplomatic tasks — promotion, outreach, feedback, management and servicing – has been suggested in the introduction to this book. On occasion and using discretion, diplomats sometimes transgress into the “domestic” arena of the host country, in an effort to persuade, to obtain a favorable outcome in legislative or regulatory formulation, or simply to influence an important decision. This is an aspect of sovereignty erosion that is under-studied, but is part of the globalization process in which the sharp distinction between “domestic” and “foreign” is often hard to make. States are more directly involved in trying to influence one another than ever before. Further, regional entities like the European Union and ASEAN, carrying out their own policies of integration, also pose special challenges for multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. These are issues on which the response of the diplomatic system is under evolution. The post-War world showed the ways political diplomacy adapted to new situations, like the emergence of former colonies as sovereign states, and the Cold War, in which countries chose between bloc membership and non-alignment. In the same way, the shape of professional diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, which is even now barely a decade old, is yet to emerge fully. We realize for instance that “public diplomacy” is going to figure even more prominently in the future, and so will the need for the diplomat to deal with a broad range of non-state entities. Even if all the contours of diplomacy of the future are not clear, we can be certain that the process of adaptation to change will continue.

 

 

Select Bibliography

 

1.      Marshall, Peter, Positive Diplomacy (Macmillan, London, 1997).

2.      Mellissen, Jan, ed. Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (Macmillan, London, 1999).

3.      Rana, Kishan S Inside Diplomacy (Manas, New Delhi, 2000), Chapter 3, pp. 61–73, Chapter 12, pp. 313–29).

 

 

Questions:

 

1.      What are the criteria relevant to the relationship between your country and two of its immediate neighbors?

2.      What are the instruments for building relations between states, as one may find from a practical example?

3.      As an ambassador, what methods would you deploy in your Mission to prepare for an intensive effort to build ties?

4.      Who should be the top three cultivation targets for an Embassy?

 

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Notes

 

 

[1] The only country of significance that is not a UN member is Switzerland, and Swiss voters have rejected several referenda that have proposed membership. This is a special consequence of their policy of neutrality view that is enshrined in the Swiss constitution. Despite this, the country is host to the UN’s European Office and a is member of several UN agencies, a few of which are also headquartered in that country.

[2] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) now has over 110 members, and remains a caucus of some value at the UN, and holds summit meetings of member-states every three years (these are also attended by “observer” countries belonging to alliances). But the focus of NAM is less sharp than before and even participation by member-states has declined in numbers and quality.

[3] The 50-odd Islamic states constitute their own organization OIC that works to a political agenda, with the paraphernalia of annual summit meetings and more frequent gatherings of foreign ministers. Despite rhetoric, it exercises limited influence.

[4] An example of differences that have been accommodated well is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) where the two differed sharply in 1994–96 when the treaty was negotiated, and India abstained. But this, and the nuclear tests India carried out in 1998, has not prevented the growth of a “strategic partnership” between the two countries.

[5] It is customary that diplomatic missions are exchanged on a reciprocal basis, though one country may retain its own embassy in the other state even if the latter does not set up a resident mission, if there are strong factors that are in play. But it is not customary to find in a particular capital say 60 or 70 resident foreign missions, when that country has set up only some 35 missions around the world. One exception to this is Singapore which hosts over 70 resident missions but sends out only some 35 of its own to foreign capitals. This is in part a tribute to the unique location of Singapore as a hub of commerce and transportation, and in part also due to the astute manner in which since the 1970s Singapore has developed the system of “non-resident ambassadors”, who are figures from public life and business, based in Singapore, who travel to the countries of their accreditation a couple of times a year and generally work to promote good ties from a distance. The receiving states have found this to be a useful formula, since it is better than no representation at all.

[6] At Independence there is a first wave of embassies that a country sets up and within the next year or two further missions are opened, depending on the funds available and the concrete interests identified — like trade, inward investment, aid and tourism prospects, ethnic factors, and the like.

[7] These methods used by West European states after World War II to create a new public support for partnership, overcoming centuries of distrust and enmity, are a model for other regions. It is interesting that the same techniques are being applied after the end of the Cold War by Germany to create new understanding with border populations in the countries that lie to its East, Poland and the Czech Republic.

[8] Alan Gotlieb’s book I’ll be with You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador gives a persuasive narration of the role of the spouse in building contacts.

[9] Spouses are also motivated to accompany diplomats to assignments abroad if they are allowed to work. In the past almost all diplomatic services did not permit this, but the wheel has turned and starting with a restricted list of jobs that the spouse could take up, most services now permit the spouse to work without imposing any conditions, other than the regulations in the receiving state. The latter usually applies the principle of reciprocity in granting work permits to the spouses. A special problem arises for the spouse of the ambassador, but most services now permit them to work as well.

[10] Alan Gotlieb, I’ll be with you in a Minute Mr. Ambassador: The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington (London, Routledge, 1995)

[11] The successor to Ambassador Galbraith in Delhi was Ambassador Chester Bowles, on his second assignment to India. He found it hard to sustain the same kind of contacts with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, as his predecessor had enjoyed with Nehru. The key element was that Indira Gandhi was less accessible than her father had been. As the years went by it became even more difficult for foreign ambassadors to meet her, as I observed in the years 1981–82 when I served on her staff. But even at that time, she was more accessible to foreign envoys than what Indian ambassadors found in many countries, especially in the West.

[12] Gotlieb, I’ll be with you in a Minute Mr. Ambassador.